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Abstract
This paper focuses on the wage elasticity of informal care supply to elderly parents em-
ploying an instrumental variable approach to account for the fact that the wage rate is likely to
be correlated with omitted variables. Using the 1998 wave of the Health and Retirement Study,
the wage elasticity of informal care supply is estimated to be negative and larger in magnitude
than found previously. The lower bound of this elasticity is estimated to be -1.8 for males
and -3.6 for females. Additional ﬁndings suggest that this wage elasticity differs by the type
of care provided to elderly parents, and that it is larger in magnitude among individuals with
siblings and those with independently living parents. Overall the reductions in the informal
care constitute about 18% of the labor supply response for men and about 56% of the labor
supply response for women, which are not compensated by monetary transfers.3
1 Introduction
For the past two decades the policy debate on issues related to the aging population has been
growing at unprecedented rates throughout the world. On the one hand, policy measures
suggested in the debate include removal of the disincentives for labor force participation for near
elderly (CBO 2004, U.S. DHHS 1997, Apfel 2004). This would have effectively raised the wage
rate faced by the targeted group, as in the case of the elimination of the Social Security earnings
test for those older than 65 in the United States (Friedberg 2000). On the other hand, the role of
informal caregiving is emphasized as a means to “keep many individuals at home who would
otherwise require expensive institutional care” (U.S. DHHS 1997, p.6). Policies targeting these
two objectives may turn out to conﬂict with each other: higher wages may decrease hours devoted
to informal care for elderly parents, while policies encouraging informal care may lead to fewer
working hours. Research on the effects of the Social Security earnings test mostly focuses on
labor supply and claiming behavior of the affected group (Haider and Loughran 2008; Baker and
Benjamin 1999; Burtless and Mofﬁtt 1984; Friedberg 2000; Gruber and Orszag 1999) with little
attention paid to the potential interaction between incentives for paid employment and caregiving
choices. This interaction may have adverse implications for the well-being of the oldest old, given
that the prevalence of caregiving is highest among individuals in their late mid-life.
Central to the analysis of this interaction is the concept of the wage elasticity. The labor supply
literature suggests a positive wage elasticity of labor supply (smaller for males, larger for
females). Therefore, if the wage elasticity of informal care supply is close to zero (as has been
found in earlier studies), higher wages would lead to more labor supplied with negligible effects
on the provision of informal care. In this case one might hope that beneﬁts from increased labor
supply will not be offset along other dimensions. If, on the contrary, the wage elasticity of
informal care supply is relatively large and negative, one should be more cautious when
evaluating the effects of ﬁscal policies on labor supply among individuals in their late mid-life. A
substantial negative wage elasticity of informal care supply would mean that along with
increasing labor supply near elderly would cut back on the hours of informal care they provide to4
their elderly parents. This may potentially lead to more people turning to the government in their
quest for help with covering formal long-term care costs.
The goal of this paper is to study the wage elasticity of informal care supply and contribute to
the literature by directly addressing the issue of omitted variables in the time allocation and
monetary transfer equations. Informal care supply is deﬁned as annual time spent helping elderly
parents with basic personal needs as well as household chores, errands, and transportation. This
paper uses a unique opportunity of access to the restricted geographic identiﬁers for the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) respondents to instrument hourly wages with the industry structure
in the state of residence allowing for differential impact by education.1
The main ﬁnding of the paper suggests that the wage elasticity of informal care supply is
negative and substantially larger in magnitude than previously estimated. Due to the weakness of
the instruments there is still a signiﬁcant remaining bias in the estimates of the wage elasticity.
However, since the direction of the bias is the same as in the OLS, the obtained estimates can be
treated as upper bounds of the true (more negative) elasticities. For example, according to the
current estimates a 10 percent increase in wages translates into an 18 percent decrease in average
informal care provided by males and 36 percent decrease in average informal care provided by
females. Additional ﬁndings include the following: (i) the wage elasticity of informal care supply
is more negative for people who have at least one sibling and those who have no parent living with
them and/or in a nursing home; (ii) the wage elasticity of help with personal needs is less negative
than the wage elasticity of time spent helping parents with chores, errands, transportation, etc.;
(iii) estimates of the wage elasticity of net monetary transfers do not support the hypothesis that
individuals replace time transfers to parents with monetary transfers as their wages go up.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents some background information,
followed by the econometric speciﬁcation in Section 3. Data is described in Section 4. Section 5
presents the empirical ﬁndings and a discussion of some extensions to the main analysis of
informal care supply. Section 6 concludes.5
2 Background
Thus far, the studies of informal care supply to elderly parents have been mostly descriptive
even though this area is receiving growing attention in various social science disciplines. In
economics a considerable body of research has been developed on the motivation behind
intergenerational transfers (for the most recent survey concerning motivation for ﬁnancial
transfers see Norton and Van Houtven (2006)) and some on residential decisions, while
sociologists, for instance, have focused on identifying the determinants of the incidence and
intensity of informal care supply paying little attention to economic factors (Schkokkaert 2006).
Several more recent works are devoted to the study of the relationship between formal and
informal care. Van Houtven and Norton (2004) ﬁnd that informal care reduces home health care
use and delay nursing home entry, while Viitanen (2007) shows that an increase in higher
government expenditures on formal care reduce the probability of informal caregiving outside the
household. Other studies are also supportive of the fact that informal and formal care are
substitutes (Bolin et al. 2007).
A few papers that consider the effect of changes in care giver’s wages on time transfers to
elderly parents study the trade-off between time and money dimensions of help using data from
the Health and Retirement Study, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and the National
Long-Term Care Survey of Informal Caregivers (Sloan et al. 2002; Zissimopoulos 2001;
Ioannides and Kan 1999; Sloan et al. 1997; Couch et al. 1999). The results from these studies
suggest that the effect of wages on informal care is not signiﬁcant, either economically or
statistically, while the wage impact on gross monetary transfers from adult children to their
parents is positive and signiﬁcant. The estimates of the wage elasticity of informal care supply
range from -0.78 to 0.07 (see Table 1). However these estimates may be subject to an omitted
variable bias. An upward bias from omitted variables may explain small magnitudes of the wage
elasticities estimated earlier. For example, some people may be more productive in everything
they do, which is difﬁcult to control for with a conventional set of variables available to
researchers. Therefore, these people would provide more care, but also would be rewarded in the6
market with higher wages. As a result, the estimated wage effect in such a case would be upward
biased, i.e. less negative.
In contrast to the scarcity of research on the wage elasticity of informal care supply, there is a
large literature that has been devoted to the study of the wage elasticity of labor supply. There
exist several generations of research in this area and they are extensively reviewed by Pencavel
(1986, 1998, 2002), Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Mroz (1987), and Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999) in an attempt to document the variation in the estimates found and determine the
sources of these differences. The overall conclusion from this literature is that the wage elasticity
of labor supply is positive and is larger for females than for males, although converging over time
(Schwabish 2002; Heim 2007).
3 Econometric Speciﬁcation
Estimation Strategy and Speciﬁcation
The theoretical framework underlying the empirical analysis is based on the simple one-period
model of time allocation that involves two individuals: the care recipient and the care giver (Sloan
et al. 2002). The care recipient refers to an elderly parent and the care giver to his/her adult child.
This model starts with the idea that the caregiver maximizes her own utility that depends on her
own consumption goods, leisure, and utility of the care recipient which in turn depends on
consumption goods and care. The maximization is subject to the production of care, the time
constraint and the standard budget constraints, with a possibility of monetary transfers between
the parties. Care can be purchased in the market or produced using the caregiver’s time.
According to this framework, the allocation decisions of the caregiver as to the time for work and
caregiving, monetary transfer, as well as purchased care will depend on the vector of prices
(caregiver’s wage and price of formal care), non-labor income, and socio-economic
characteristics of the caregiver and the care recipient. Unfortunately, the data used in the
empirical analysis do not provide any information on market-purchased help by care recipients or7
prices they face, thus reducing the system to three equations2:
t
gi = aglog wi+Xibg+ugi (1)
tgi = max(0;t
gi)
twi = awlog wi+Xibw+uwi (2)
Di = aDlog wi+XibD+uDi (3)
where tgi is annual hours of informal care for elderly parents, twi = annual working hours, Di =
annual net money transfer to elderly parents, wi = individual’s hourly wage rate, and Xi is a vector
of controls for individual i, discussed later.
The wage effect on informal care supply is estimated using the Tobit model, as in most of the
studies on informal care supply3, to incorporate corner solutions into the estimation. A linear-log
speciﬁcation is chosen for the labor supply and money transfer equations.4 All three equations are
estimated separately for men and women. Since the model has three equations with identical
regressors, generalized least squares for the system of linear equations produces as efﬁcient
estimates as the ordinary least squares equation-by-equation (Greene 2000, 616). However, a
complication arises due to the fact that not all of the equations in the system are linear.
Bhattacharya (2004) shows that in the case of the binary dependent variable, the joint estimation
produces more efﬁcient estimates. No study investigates the case of the limited dependent
variable that follows the Tobit model. So it is assumed that in general the estimation
equation-by-equation of the model with two linear and one Tobit equations would be less
efﬁcient, but still consistent, as is the case with the system of linear equations or binary outcomes.
Econometric Issues with the Wage Effect Estimation
If the hours of informal care are jointly determined with the hours of labor supply then wages
are expected to be endogenous (see Carlin (2001) for similar discussion on volunteer labor
supply). Some of the factors that enter Equations (1)-(3) are not available in the data. For8
example, information on some of the important determinants of the informal care supply, such as
the price of formal care as well as unobserved personality traits related to productivity in
caregiving and willingness to help others (responsibility, respect for seniors, etc.) is usually not
available to researchers. Lack of this information is likely to lead to the problems associated with
omitted variables. The estimates of the wage elasticity of informal care supply would not be
biased if the assumption of zero correlation between wages and omitted variables were plausible,
and the equation was linear. However, in the current setting this is not true. For example, the price
of formal care is likely to be higher for people living in high-wage areas, and failure to control for
this would result in an upward biased estimate of the wage effect on informal caregiving time.
Similarly, the productivity in caregiving may be positively correlated with the productivity on the
job leading to an upward bias in the wage effect estimate. This upward bias can explain the close
to zero estimates of the wage effect on informal care supply in the earlier studies.
The omitted variable problem in the caregiving analysis is similar to that found in estimating
standard labor supply elasticities. Over the last few decades a number of attempts have been
undertaken to use different instrumental variables in the labor supply setting. Pencavel (1986)
mentions sets of instruments used in the early literature which have since been disqualiﬁed (Mroz,
1987). These include such variables as own education, experience, and the reported hourly wage
rate used to instrument the wage rate calculated from earnings and hours. Somewhat controversial
instruments are education of parents and their socio-economic status, lagged values of the wage
rate, urban residence indicator, and polynomials in age and education. Sets of aggregated
information such as unemployment rates and industry structure in the region of residence, cohort
average schooling, other group level variables, and polynomials in regional and time trends have
been shown to be better instruments (Pencavel 2002; Senesky 2003; Bacolod 2007), as they have
no impact on the labor supply but through wages. However, since these instruments are aggregate
level variables, they are not very strong predictors of wages.
This study offers a novel set of both aggregate and individual level instruments for wages which
is inspired by the literature investigating recent upward trend in earnings inequality. Factors9
contributing to this trend have a differential impact on wages of less educated versus more
educated workers. Perhaps, two most inﬂuential factors include international trade and
employment shifts from goods-producing to service-producing industries. For example, Borjas
and Ramey (1995) ﬁnd that less educated workers in concentrated manufacturing industries
experience larger negative impact of net imports than more educated workers. Through the
outﬂow of less educated workers from concentrated to competitive industries, a qualitatively
similar spillover effect is observed in competitive manufacturing industries. In addition,
Blackburn (1990) ﬁnds that the wage inequality is higher in service-producing industries than in
goods-producing industries. Therefore, the industry structure in the labor market should be able
to explain wage differences among workers with different levels of education. These
considerations justify the choice of the instruments.
The instrumet set includes state unemployment rate and state industry structure described by
the percentages of the working population employed in each of the services, government, and
three manufacturing sectors – trade-impacted concentrated industries, competitive industries, and
other durables industries5 and interactions of these aggregate variables with the education level of
respondents. The assumption behind this choice of instruments is that they reﬂect only the labor
demand conditions and are not related to the choice of hours spent on various activities (labor,
caregiving) directly or through omitted variables. Regional dummies are included to control for
such factors as formal care opportunities and prices.6
The analysis is based on the sample of near elderly working individuals who are at risk of
providing care for their elderly parents, i.e. their parents are still alive. The focus on near elderly
is justiﬁed by the fact that the fraction of women providing care is highest among the 45-64 age
group [near elderly]: 13 percent compared to 10 percent for women of 30-44 years old and 7
percent of women 65 years old or older (Commonwealth Fund’s (1999) report cited in McGarry
(2003)). Restricting attention to working individuals allows using the observed (actual or
calculated for salaried workers) hourly wage rate without a need for an imputation (which often
requires strong and arguable assumptions and exclusion restrictions). However, focusing on only10
working individuals raises the issue of selectivity bias, for which there is some evidence in the
empirical literature, although it is not conclusive.
In the context of intergenerational transfers, especially informal care, the selectivity issue may
be serious if caregiving responsibilities draw people out of the labor force or into retirement.
Some studies in sociology and gerontology do show that in general caregiving women are more
likely to quit employment than non-caregiving (Dentinger and Clarkberg 2002; Pavalko and
Henderson 2006), while others suggest no effect (Pienta 2003; Johnson and Favreault 2001; Coile
2004). Yet, others ﬁnd that the effect depends on the residential status: caregiving responsibilities
have signiﬁcant impact on exit from the labor force only for women who co-reside with their
elderly parents (Ettner 1995) and on weekly working hours in case of non-coresident parents
(Ettner 1996). At the same time there is no effect of caregiving responsibilities on male labor
supply measured as unconditional weekly working hours (Ettner 1996). The only direct test of the
impact of caregiving responsibilities for elderly parents on retirement decisions is done by Kazi
(2006) who shows that the potential parent care needs do not accelerate exit into retirement.
In the labor supply context, Mroz (1987) offers a comprehensive investigation of the sample of
married women, the population group for which the selectivity issue has always been considered
important. He ﬁnds that even in this case selection does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the
estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply as long as labor market experience is not treated
as an exogenous determinant of wages (i.e., as an instrument).
4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The main analysis in this paper is implemented using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
data from the 1998 wave.7 The Health and Retirement Study is a national longitudinal survey of
people born in 1947 and earlier providing a rich source of information on the lives of older
Americans, including their health and economic status.
The analysis focuses on a cross-section of working individuals8 who can potentially provide11
time to their parents or parents-in-law (both are referred to as “parents” throughout the paper). In
the present study parents are treated as a group, similar to Ioannides and Kan (2000). Year 1998
has been chosen as the year that allows the largest sample size of individuals with living parents
possible among all the HRS waves.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables used in the main analysis are annual working hours, annual hours
spent helping parents with basic needs and household chores, and net annual monetary transfer to
parents (gross transfer to parents minus gross transfer from parents). Annual working time is the
product of usual weekly hours of work and number of weeks worked across all jobs.
The questions concerning intergenerational transfers are asked as follows:
Now about help to and from parents...
1. Not counting any shared housing or shared food, did you give ﬁnancial help to
your parents or parents-in-law amounting to $500 or more [since last interview,
in the last two years]?
How about another kind of help:
2. Did you spend a total of 100 or more hours [since last interview, in the last two
years] helping your (deceased) [parents] with basic personal activities like
dressing, eating, and bathing?
3. Did you spend a total of 100 or more hours [since last interview, in the last two
years] helping your (deceased) [parents] with other things such as household
chores, errands, transportation, etc.?
If the answer is “yes” to these questions, then the respondent is asked the amount of the transfer
provided over the past two years. Overall, the effective annual time spent helping parents is
deﬁned here as the sum of the time spent helping parents with basic personal needs and time spent12
helping parents with household chores. Although the question is asked so that the dependent
variable should be left-censored at 50 hours a year, in practice, a considerable number of
individuals reported time in caregiving smaller than 50 hours (112 out of 387 cases with positive
care hours among males and 68 out of 495 cases among females). Thus, in the current analysis
the lower limit on time use is set to zero. It should be noted that because of the two-year reference
period, information on intergenrational transfers (time and money) is taken from the 2000 wave of
the data, while explanatory variables - from the 1998 wave. It is assumed that individuals make
transfer decisions for the period from 1998 to 2000 based on the information they have in 1998.
Explanatory Variables
The variable of interest - hourly wage rate - is taken directly if reported on an hourly basis.9
Otherwise, it is constructed by dividing earnings from the main job over a certain time period
(year, month, two weeks, week) by the standardized annual working hours to avoid the negative
division bias.10
The set of individual controls in all speciﬁcations include the following: age, age squared,
education, education squared, current non-wage income deﬁned as capital income, household
wealth, marital status, non-white, Hispanics, region dummies (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999),
number of young children (0-6 years old), number of 6-18 year-old children (Mroz 1987), and
number of siblings by gender, own and in-laws. The last variables aim to control for other
possible time demands and availability of substitutes. Mulligan (1995) suggests the inclusion of
health measures since disutility from work may increase as people age. Therefore, health
measures may become signiﬁcant determinants of labor supply, as well as of informal care
supply, for older workers.
In addition to the individual characteristics, all of the speciﬁcations in the main analysis include
characteristics of parents. These characteristics refer to the set of all living parents and include the
number of surviving parents (maximum four), the ratio of the number of mothers to the number of
living parents, the age of the oldest parent, the indicators if at least one of the parents (i) is single,13
(ii) has a memory related disease, (iii) is a homeowner, and (iv) is identiﬁed by the respondent as
being ﬁnancially worse off or better off than the respondent. The indicator of whether there is at
least one parent with the memory related disease is used as a proxy for the need of care, which
seems to be difﬁcult to misreport. The other related questions in the HRS ask whether the parent
needs care, or whether the parent can be left alone for at least one hour. It seems that these
questions are more subjective that the one chosen for the analysis: if a respondent is providing a
signiﬁcant number of hours of care, (s)he is much more likely to report that the parent needs care
and/or cannot be left alone for at least one hour. Similarly, the one who does not want to provide
care seem to be more likely to respond that the parent does not need care and can be left alone for
a long period of time.11
Sample Description
The sample is limited to working, not self-employed, age-eligible12 individuals who have at
least one parent or parent-in-law alive in 1998.13 Individuals retired in 1998 are excluded from
the study. The resulting sample consists of 1434 males and 1356 females who have complete data
on all of the variables of interest. See Appendix Table A1 for the sample construction details.
Table 2 presents a description of the sample. All ﬁnancial variables are in 2002 dollars and
non-labor income is in thousands of dollars. As can be seen from Panel A, the mean annual
working hours for male workers is on average 400 hours higher than for females (2290 hours vs.
1897 hours). Unconditional (on caregiving status) caregiving hours average at 44 hours per year
for males and 91 hours per year for females (2% and 5% of the average annual working time
respectively). The difference widens to about 100 hours between males and females when
conditioning on actual caregiving status (163 vs. 250 hours). Consideration by the type of
caregiving suggests that the difference between men and women involved in caregiving is greater
in time devoted to help with personal needs than in time devoted to help with chores,
transportation, errands, etc.14 Net money transfer is negative indicating that on average money
ﬂows into the care givers’ households from their parents. Descriptive statistics for the explanatory14
variables is presented in Panel B of Table 2.
5 Empirical Results and Discussion
Wage Elasticity Estimates
Table 3 shows the estimates of the wage impact on labor supply, informal care, and monetary
transfers from both OLS/Tobit and instrumental variable regressions.15 As could be seen the
effect of wages on the informal care supply is negative and it is increasing in magnitude after
instrumenting.16 The magnitude of the wage effect on informal care supply is smaller for men
than it is for women, and it is not statistically signiﬁcant for men. The wage effect on labor supply
is positive in every case both for males and females and increases in magnitude considerably after
instrumenting.
The analysis of the net monetary transfers between adult children and elderly parents does not
provide evidence for the substitution between time and monetary transfers as wages get higher.
One of the potential explanations may be the possibility that the measure of the net monetary
transfer over a certain short period of time does not allow for that substitution effect to take place.
For example, what if the decrease in the informal care provided today is balanced with the
decrease in the end-of-life transfer from parents? Indeed, Brown (2006) ﬁnds that parents on
average bequeath more to children who are currently providing informal care or who are expected
to become care givers in the future. It is not possible to compare the obtained estimates to those in
the previous literature because of the differences in the way transfers are measured. As mentioned
before, past studies analyzed gross measure of monetary transfers - either money given by parents
to adult children or received by parents from adult children. Since the interest in the current
analysis has been in the overall compensation for decreased informal care in response to higher
wages, the net monetary transfer has been chosen as the most appropriate resulting measure.
However, the magnitude and the sign of the estimated wage elasticities of net monetary transfers
as well as the peculiarities of the distribution of net monetary transfers do call for further15
investigation on the more appropriate empirical approach to their analysis.
The last panel of Table 3 provides ﬁrst-stage statistics common to all regressions while the
p-values from the Hansen overidentiﬁcation tests are reported for each outcome measure
separately. As could be seen, the latter test produces very high p-values, conﬁrming the validity of
the used instruments. Likewise, the hypothesis of underidentiﬁcation is rejected at less than 1
percent level of signiﬁcance. However, the comparison of the ﬁrst stage F-statistics with the
critical values reported in Stock and Yogo (2004) points to the problem of weak instruments even
if 30 percent relative bias in the same direction as the OLS/ Tobit bias is accepted. Stock and
Yogo (2004) do not report critical values for higher than 30 percent relative bias, but it could be
extrapolated from Table 1 in their work (p.39) that for the 50 percent relative bias the ﬁrst stage
F-statistics would be sufﬁcient to pass the weak instruments test. This means that the set of the
instruments used in the analysis is quite weak resolving only 50 percent of the omitted variable
bias. Alternatively, this means that the value of the estimate of the wage elasticity of informal care
supply is far from the true one, and can only be treated as an upper bound of a more negative
elasticity.
The estimates of the wage elasticities evaluated at the sample means are provided in Table 4.
The estimates from the OLS and Tobit regressions show negative but close to zero wage
elasticities of informal care supply. Compared to them, IV procedure produces much larger
estimates: -1.8 for males and -3.6 for females. The wage elasticity of labor supply is also
considerably larger in magnitude after instrumenting.
It is instructive to think about the magnitudes of the estimated elasticities: a 10% increase in
wages (2.1 for men and 1.5 for women in 2002 dollars) would lead to an average decrease by 18%
for men and 36% for women in unconditional hours of care provided. That would translate into 8
fewer hours of care provided by men and 33 fewer hours of care provided by women per year.
The same increase in wages, with the labor supply elasticity of 0.19 (men) and 0.31 (women)17,
implies 44 hours more work per annum for men and 59 for women. This comparison suggests
that the wage elasticity of care supply is far from being trivial. On the contrary, in absolute terms16
it makes up about 18% of the labor supply response for men and about 56% of the labor supply
response for women.
Since the focus of this study is on the informal care that adult children provide to their elderly
parents, the rest of this section will consider some important extensions in turns: impact of the
availability of substitutes and parents’ living arrangements. Panel BV of Table 4 presents the
relevant estimates.
Availability of Substitutes
While the analysis above focuses on the total time devoted to parents, the detailed information
in the data also allows studying the wage effects on the care supply disaggregated by the type of
activities. It is reasonable to expect the help with household chores to be more elastic: it may be
less burdensome and not as urgent as personal care. Hence, it is easier to postpone the task or to
ﬁnd a substitute. For example, the frequency of household chores or money management can be
easier to reduce in the face of increasing wage rates compared to the tasks of bathing, dressing,
and feeding the elderly parents.
Rows (1)-(2) in Panel B of Table 4 provide information for the comparison of the wage
elasticities of informal care supply by different types of caregiving activities not conditioning on
the actual caregiving status. As can be seen, the estimated wage elasticity of help with household
chores is generally larger in magnitude and statistically more signiﬁcant than that of the help with
basic personal needs, and the difference is greater for females.
Row (3) shows that individuals with siblings (the majority of the sample) are more responsive
to changes in the wage rates, with the estimates of the wage elasticities being considerably larger
than in the benchmark case in row (3) of Panel A.18
To summarize, these ﬁndings suggest that the wage elasticity of informal care supply depends
on the availability and ease of substitution. The easier it is to ﬁnd a substitute for a certain
caregiving task (either because the task itself is not unpleasant, or because a care giver has more
siblings to rely on) the larger in absolute value the wage elasticity is.17
Parents’ Living Arrangements
Current analysis does not account for the differences in living arrangements of elderly parents.
It includes respondents with parents living independently, with the respondent or other relatives,
or in nursing home. At the same time this potentially may have considerable impact on the
results. On the one hand, the amount of care provided may depend on how far the parent lives
from the child, suggesting living arrangement as another control in the model. On the other hand,
parents’ living arrangements can be considered as part of the informal care supply decisions:
when the need for more care arises, parents may relocate closer to the child, or start coresiding
together. Earlier literature tried to circumvent this problem by excluding pairs with coresident
parents and parents in nursing homes. Last three rows in Panel B, Table 4, show the results for the
samples of individuals excluding individuals with at least one parent (i) coresiding with them, (ii)
in nursing home, (iii) either coresiding or in nursing home. Although, the estimated elasticities
change slightly, and in some cases the estimated effects become statistically insigniﬁcant, they are
still quite close to the ones obtained from the basic analysis. Thus, the estimates obtained earlier
are fairly robust to the differences in the living arrangements of elderly parents.
6 Conclusion
This paper extends the existing literature on informal caregiving by addressing the issue of
omitted variable bias in the estimates of the wage elasticity of informal care supply. Existence of
this bias would suggest that the previous estimates may be too small. Using the state level
unemployment rate and industry structure and their interactions with education as instruments for
wages, this study ﬁnds that the elasticity of informal care supply with respect to wages is negative
and large in magnitude. Although the problem of weak instruments suggests a signiﬁcant
remaining bias, the estimates of the wage elasticity of informal care supply can be treated as
upper bounds, drawing attention to the presence of considerable in magnitude negative impact of
wages on informal care for elderly.18
As in the case of labor supply, the supply of informal care by females tends to be more elastic
than that by males. Furthermore, informal care supply is more elastic for individuals who have
siblings and independently living parents, and is more elastic when considering time spent
helping parents with household chores, errands, transportation, etc., suggesting that the
availability of the substitutes and the ease of substitution matters a lot for the magnitude of the
informal care supply response to wages. However, the analysis does not support the hypothesis of
substitution from time towards monetary transfers to elderly parents as wages get higher.
To conclude, this paper shows that the ﬁscal incentives which would effectively increase wages
of near elderly could bring more hours of labor supplied. However, this increase may be
accompanied by a decrease in the number of hours of informal care provided to the elderly. The
question remains of whether the beneﬁts from increased labor supply (and corresponding earnings
increase) would outweigh the costs associated with lower levels of informal care. And the answer
depends on many other estimates - average tax rates, prices of formal care, likelihood that the
elderly would seek government support to cover the formal care costs, and the consequences to
those who would decide not to seek any care, as well as the parents’ altruistic welfare gain from
improved well-being of adult children - which deﬁnitely require further investigation.19
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Notes
1Initial access to the restricted data has been provided through the project under the supervision
of David Neumark and Elizabeth Powers.
2Monetary transfers incorporate ﬂows of money in both directions but time transfer in the
model ﬂows only from the care giver to the care recipient for two reasons. First of all, the model is
developed to describe the relationship between a care giver and a care recipient. The latter, being
in need of care from other people, is unable of producing that care for him/herself, and therefore
unable to provide any care for others. Secondly, in the HRS 1998 sample the prevalence and
magnitude of time ﬂow from elderly parents to adult children is quite low - it is virtually zero after
the age 80. On the contrary, as the description of the data will show later, ﬁnancial transfers are
likely to ﬂow in both directions, no matter how old the involved parties are.
3Another alternative would be to use the two-part Cragg’s model (Sloan et al. 2002). But the
sizeofthesampleofactualcaregiversinthatcasewouldbetoosmallfortheuseoftheinstrumental
variable methods.
4Even though the distribution of net monetary transfers has most of its mass on zero, the OLS
still provides best linear prediction and allows for consistent estimates of parameters around mean.
5Trade-impacted concentrated industries include: Stone, Clay and Glass Products; Primary
Metal Industries; Industrial Machinery and Equipment; Motor Vehicles and Equipment; Other
Transportation Equipment. Trade-impacted competitive industries include Apparel and Other Tex-
tile Product Industries. Other durables industries include the rest of the manufacturing sector:
Lumber and Wood Products; Furniture and Fixtures; Fabricated Metal Products; Electronic and
Other Electric Equipment; Instruments and Related Products; Miscellaneous Manufacturing; and
Ordinance.25
6Inclusion of the variable reﬂecting price of formal care at the state level, such as average
wages of the personnel, does not change the estimates of the wage elasticity considerably while
having virtually no explanatory power on their own. This may suggest that these measures are poor
proxies for the variation in the prices at the individual level. Description of this exercise and the
full set of estimates are available upon request.
7The HRS is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant number NIA U01AG 009740)
and is conducted by the University of Michigan.
8Workers include those who report positive working hours and do not report full retirement in
1998.
950% of males and 56% of females report being paid hourly.
10Standardized annual working hours are calculated as weeks worked last year multiplied by 40
if the individual reported usual weekly hours being greater than 25 and by 20 if the reported usual
weekly hours are less than or equal to 25 (Kimmel and Kniesner 1998).
11The sensitivity analysis including all of the indicators of the parental care needs available in
the HRS shows little effect on the wage elasticity estimates, while the coefﬁcients on the parental
care needs indicators become not statistically signiﬁcant, reﬂecting their high levels of correlation.
12Age-eligible means those individuals who are aged 50 and over. Since some people had
spouses younger than that age, the HRS interviewed them as well, but including them would not
be desirable for the current study.
13Although the HRS has a great potential in studying the dynamics of many interesting pro-
cesses, the question in this study cannot beneﬁt from this richness mainly because of the time
frame to which the question on informal care refers. Individuals are asked about their caregiving
over the past 2 years. Over that long period of time, they are likely to go through several statuses
- from potential caregivers to moderate contributors to elderly care to intensive caregiving to the26
extreme of loosing parents or their recovering. At the same time over that 2 year time window, the
wage rate is unlikely to change much, likewise the instrument set suggested in the paper. Simi-
larly, the variables which describe the parental status are measured every two years. Therefore, the
caregiving decisions would be subject to change due to mostly unobserved health characteristics
of the parents over these two years. And thus, the model which would try to explain changes in
the supply of care with the changes in the explanatory variables will be very noisy. This has been
conﬁrmed by virtual absence of explanatory power of the ﬁxed effect model at the earlier stages of
current research.
14This fact may simply reﬂect the higher life expectancy for women and preferences for the
same-sex helper with the basic needs.
15Withregardtotheinstrumentalvariableestimation, almostallestimatedparameters, exceptfor
the wage effects, are relatively consistent across speciﬁcations in terms of statistical signiﬁcance
and sign. Full sets of estimates associated with the numerous covariates are available from the
author upon request.
16Results from the 1st stage regression are presented in Appendix Table A5.
17Unfortunately no instrumental variable estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply for
older workers is known to the author. However, the wage elasticity from the OLS regression is
almost identical to that reported for older workers by Schmidt and Sevak (2006). At the same time
the IV estimates fall within the range of the wage elasticity for all workers: for women from 0.13
(Mroz 1987) to 0.59 (Blau and Kahn 2007) and for men from 0.05 to 0.22 (Pencavel 2002).
18Given the ﬁndings in the previous literature that daughters are more likely to provide care it
wouldbemorelogicaltoinvestigatethesampleexcludingindividualswithoutanysiblingandthose
with only brothers. However, this would have made the sample too small to implement reasonable
instrumental variable analysis: the sample of individuals without either sisters or sisters-in-law is
428 for males and 314 for females.27
Table 1: Estimates of the Wage Elasticities of Care Supply from Previous Research










from any child -0.05*
from male child 0.07 -0.07 0.07
from female child -0.05 0.16 -0.02
Sloan et al. (2002), 1992 HRS
Caregivers, hurdle in logs
Probit OLS
coefﬁcient coefﬁcient
Care 0.18 (0.14) -0.11 (0.13)
Chores -0.10 (0.09) 0.05 (0.06)




Sloan et al. (1997), 1989 NLTCS of Informal Caregivers
Care Recipients, linear OLS corrected for selectivity





1. Standard errors of the wage elasticities have not been presented in the reviewed studies and
so signs near the estimates indicate the statistical signiﬁcance of the wage effects, not the
signiﬁcance of the wage elasticities.
2. ** - signiﬁcant at 1% level, * - signiﬁcant at 5%, + - signiﬁcant at 10%.28
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Males Females
Sample Size 1434 1356
A. Dependent Variables
Annual working hours 2290.15 (660.29) 1897.29 (653.51)
Annual care hours, unconditional 44.04 (162.20) 91.13 (312.69)
Annual care hours, conditional 163.18 (279.61) 250.00 (478.32)
Prevalence of caregiving 0.27 0.36
Annual personal care hours, uncond 16.81 (105.78) 40.31 (235.42)
Annual personal care hours, cond 213.27 (317.65) 325.87 (597.28)
Annual chores hours, uncond 27.23 (91.35) 50.81 (160.23)
Annual chores care hours, cond 110.94 (157.33) 156.12 (250.05)
Net annual money transfer -190.79 (2489.68) -110.55 (2333.33)
B. Explanatory Variables
Hourly Wage 20.77 (12.55) 14.59 (8.73)
Non-labor Income (capital income) 12.41 (227.12) 6.55 (17.11)
Total Wealth 237.76 (402.96) 254.07 (703.86)
Age 57.11 (4.40) 56.21 (4.17)
Education 13.10 (3.07) 13.08 (2.52)
If non-white 0.14 0.18
If hispanic 0.09 0.06
If married 0.88 0.72
If in poor health
Number of children < 6 years old 0.04 (0.25) 0.04 (0.23)
Number of children 6-18 years old 0.30 (0.70) 0.18 (0.53)
Number of own sisters 0.28 (0.89) 0.29 (0.93)
Number of own brothers 0.24 (0.83) 0.27 (0.79)
Number of sisters-in-law 0.40 (1.09) 0.23 (0.82)
Number of brothers-in-law 0.36 (0.98) 0.20 (0.75)
Number of parents 1.64 (0.80) 1.50 (0.70)
Share of mothers 0.74 (0.34) 0.74 (0.35)
Oldest parent’s age 82.05 (6.48) 83.08 (6.12)
If at least one parent is
single 0.97 0.96




Note: Numbers in the table are sample averages and numbers in parentheses are standard
deviations.29
Table 3: Wage Effect Estimates
Males Females
Tobit/OLS IV-Tobit/2SLS Tobit/OLS IV-Tobit/2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 1434 1434 1356 1356
Annual Care Hours
-26.71 -310.92 -55.88 -920.66*
(26.64) (194.74) (44.72) (426.85)
Uncensored obs 387 387 495 495
Chi-Square 76.23** 66.13** 94.78** 70.99**
Observed P(y > 0) 0.2699 0.3950
Pred. P(y > 0jx) 0.2619 0.3549
Annual Working Hours
39.72 432.90+ 275.27** 587.40+
(44.67) (243.00) (45.60) (336.17)
R-square/F-stat 0.11 9.19 0.13 4.03
Hansen J-test p-val=0.7311 p-val=0.4037
Net Money Transfer
57.20 571.62 175.86 -2,288.26+
(117.82) (845.36) (145.25) (1270.68)
R-Square/F-stat 0.05 2.28 0.04 1.61
Hansen J-test p-val=0.5423 p-val=0.2876
Common First-stage Statistics
30% rel.bias critical value 4.80 4.80
First stage F-stat 3.10 2.19
First stage partial R sq 0.0219 0.0133
Ho: underidentiﬁcation p-val=0.0016 p-val=0.0094
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
2. ** - signiﬁcant at 1% level, * - signiﬁcant at 5%, + - signiﬁcant at 10%.
3. Every estimate is from the regression with the full set of individual and parental controls
described in the methodology.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1. Sample Selection Criteria
Males Females
Initial Sample Interviewed in 1998 9669 13212
If non-missing state of residence 8704 90.02% 12139 91.88%
If Age Eligible 6566 67.91% 8151 61.69%
Potential Caregivers 3305 34.18% 3318 25.11%
If not retired in 1998 2425 25.08% 2748 20.80%
If working and 0<wage reported<100 1817 18.79% 1617 12.24%
If 0<annual working hours<5200 1773 18.34% 1568 11.87%
If non-missing respondent’s characteristics 1769 18.30% 1554 11.76%
If parents’ info is non-missing 1765 18.25% 1546 11.70%
If non-self employed 1434 14.83% 1356 10.26%32
Table A2. Estimation Results: First-Stage Wage Regression
Males Females
Log hourly wage (1) (2)
Individual characteristics
Unemployment rate -0.050** -0.020
(0.019) (0.021)
Share of employment in trade-impacted concentrated industries -0.189* 0.073
(0.082) (0.087)
Share of employment in trade-impacted competitive industries -0.076 -0.223
(0.213) (0.239)
Share in trade-impacted durable goods industries 0.188* -0.082
(0.079) (0.085)
Share of employment in services industries -0.004* -0.017
(0.023) (0.025)
Share of employment in government jobs -0.008* -0.067+
(0.035) (0.040)
Interaction terms
Education in trade-impacted concentrated industries 0.015** -0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
Education in trade-impacted competitive industries 0.014 0.016
(0.015) (0.017)
Education in trade-impacted durable goods industries -0.016** 0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
Education of employment in services industries 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)




Partial R-squared 0.0219 0.0133
F-stat of excluded IVs 3.10 2.19
Note: Other controls include all of the variables used in the main regressions: individual charac-
teristics, parental characteristics, and region dummies.